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To the Honorable Chief Justice and the Assodate Justices 
of thP. 81.1,preme Court of Appeals of VirgifiJj,a: 
Your Petitioner, the Hill School, a corpotation, respect-
fully shows unto Your Honors· that it is aggrreved by a final 
judgment of the Circuit Court for Fauquier I ounty, entered 
on April 7th, 1939, on a certain scire facias,, issued in that 
court against John R. Buchanan, summonin,· him to show 
cause why an award of execution upon a ju gment for the 
sum of $1,644.87, entered October 15th, 193 , in its favor 
against him, and upon which no execution · d been issued 
within the year, should not be granted. Th said John R. 
Buchanan appeared on the return day an : filed written 
grounds of objection to such an award. On e hearing the 
court on April 7th, 1939, entered its final ju gment holding 
the judgment to be void and refusing to a · ard execution 
thereon. This is the error complained of. 
*STATEMENT OF THE CAS . 
I 
This case is the outgrowth of that of John .. Bu,cha;nan v. 
Ridh Lester Buchanan, heretofore pending in t , is Court, upon 
" certain points otl1er than the ones now pre ented, and de-
· ....... 
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termined in this court by its judgment entered therein on ~ 
March 10th, · 1938, 170 Va. 458, especially the order of the 
court entered October 15, 1935, in "favor of eight different 
parties for varying amounts for clothing, tuition, medical, 
surgical and like services, rendered by them respectively to 
the children of said John R. Buchanan under a contract by 
which he bound himself to pay all of such expenses and is in 
effect a test case to determine the status of all of these judg-
ments. 
The entire record in that case, a printed transcript of 
which Record No. 1885-which so far as necessary for that 
decision-is already among the records of this court, is asked 
to be inspected with and-as a part of the transcript now pre-
sented from which the fo~lowing facts will appear. 
1. Following a separation between John R. Buchanan, the 
appellee., and his wife, Ruth Lester Buchanan, they on May 
18th, 1931, entered into a written contract under seal by which . 
the appellee for value agreed to provide a home for herself 
and for their children at "Leny Manor" in •:@auquier County, 
and in addition to pay her $1,500.00 per month, to be applied 
at her discretion for its and their maintenance and support, 
including the purchase o~ supplies and food stuffs,-the pay-
ment of all help and servants; feed for the horses ·and 
3• ponies, and necessary *clothing for the children, and 
their ordinary medical and dental. bills. In addition 
he agreed 
''to pay all bills for board and tuition in connection with the 
· education of said children while they are at boarding school 
. or college and all extraordinary medical and dental bills.'' 
2. That the appellee within seven weeks thereafter oh-
tained in a Nevada Court-uncontested. except by formal an-
swer denying inter alia the jurisdiction of the court-a decree 
of divorce, which d~ree at his instance and special prayer 
adopted and incorporated in itself the contract. Immediately 
after the decree he returned to Virginia and h~s resided 
therein continuously since. 
3. That after complying with said contract for two years 
the appellee in June, 1933, defaulted in paying the annuity 
installments then due, filed a petition in habeas corpu,s in 
Fauquier Court alleging that his wife was misapplying in 
part the monthly payments being made to her, and was not 
a proper person for the custody of the children. 
4. Appellant replied denying all allegations of misappli-
• I 
I 
I 
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cation and unfitness, but before the case cquld be heard on 
its merits the parties agreed on certain alterations of the 
contract, calculated to avoid friction on thatjpoint, to be con-
·tmmmated by a valid order of the Fauquier Cpurt directing its 
performance, but leaving the validity of the Nevada decree to 
be passed on by the court. The Court on September 29, 1933, 
entered an order, which, without materially \altering the cus-
tody provisions of the original contrac~ and decree, ex-
4 • cept as incident to a change *in locatio~ of the home to 
be provided thereunder, sustained the\ validity of the 
Nevada decree, and confirmed said modification and ordered 
compliance therewith. Though material changes were made 
in the manner in which the expenses for th~ maintenance of 
·said home and of the children were to be :financed, all of such 
expenses, however, were _still to be met e:tlusively by the 
father and as they matured. 1 
5. These changes were as follows : ! · 
I 
(a) Instead of providing Leny Manor asJ a home for the 
mother and her children, and paying the mother $1,500.00 
per month for its maintenance as a home for[herself and ·chil-
dren, as well as for their maintenance, he agreed to pay her 
$375.00 per month to be used by her for the maintenance of 
such a home alone, and she was relieved of the duty of pay-
ing the children's maintenance bills from the![ sums to be paid 
her thereunder. 
(b) FJ:e agreed to pay '' promptly as theyj mature all bills 
incurred, or to be incurred, for the proper cf othing, support, 
maintenance and education of the infant children * * • in 
accordance with their station in life." I 
6. He failed to comply with the provisions of this con-
tract and order, so far as they involved pa ent for tuition 
and maintenance bills of his chi1dren. 
7. That he even declined to discuss wit i the mother, as 
provided in said contract, any of the pro ems arising by 
reason thereof. 
8. That subsequently the mother was co pelled to incur 
personal liability to meet these necess ry expenses of 
5* •the children in her custody, and to indu e third persons, 
including the Hill School, to furnish the \educational a.nd 
other facilities incumbent on their father un er the contract, 
although he continued until March, 1937, to !pay the $375.00 
per month for the maintenance of the home • 
9. That, on_ November 26th, 1934, the other filed her 
petition in the Fauquier Court alleging the acts above men-
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tioned and amongst others that it had become necessary to 
discontinue the attendance of their elder son, James, at the ·_ 
Fay School, which he had been attending, and make arrange-
ments for his entrance at some other school of like character 
and standing ( Record # 1885, p. 78), and thoug·h she had at-
tempted to take the matter -µp with their father he utterly 
failed and refused to make any response to such suggestions ; 
that after discussing· it with the authorities of Fay School 
· and others, and with her son, she had concluded that the Hill 
School in Pennsylvania was the ·best; that her son, James, also 
discussed the matter with his father, and up until as late as 
September 15th, 1934, he had led the children and through 
them his wife to believe that he had acquiesced in her arrange-
ment, but subsequently without warning or notice he at-
tempted by force to compel the children who were then on a 
visit to him to remain with him and attend a day school at 
Warrenton. The upshot of this had been that the boys had 
escaped from their father's residence in a storm and she 
6" had been compelled to enter James at the Hill *School. 
She prayed that the habeas corpus petition be restored ' 
to the active docket and that her petition be permitted to be 
'filed therewith, and treated as a cross complaint; that the 
court give proper directions for the proper education and 
training of tl1e children, and that the said John R. Buchanan 
, be required to adopt such a course as to secure the prompt 
payment by him of all proper obligations and expenses inci-
dent to the proper education, training, clothing and mainte-
nance of said cbildren according to their station in life, pres-
ent and prospective, and that he be required to pay proper 
attorney's fees in connection with the petition. 
10. That Buchanan filed an answer to this petition, which 
he also prayed to be treated as a cross vetition. He admitted 
many of the allegations of said petition, denied others and 
sought to excuse others. Among other things it alleged (Rec-
ord #1885, p. 87) that: 
"he has made every honest effort available to promptly meet 
his obligations, especially his obligations for the proper 
maintenance and care of his children.'' 
but for some time he had been unable to live on his income 
estimated from $40,000.00 to $75,000.00, and had been._forced 
to borrow large sums of money. He admitted the allegations 
in respect to the day school episode; that neither the Fay 
n·or the Fessenden School_had benefited his sons; and denied 
that any attempt was made by the mother to discuss with him 
i 
I 
,. i 
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the matter of schools for the present year, ~xcept one letter. 
from her attorney. · I 
7* *He claimed that he had stated that pe did not favor 
tbe Hill School and had suggested the Stuyvesant School 
in Warrenton; that when the time came foT them to enter 
Stuyvesant they refused, and on the mortling '' they were 
supposed to go to school they both left his hquse without say-
ing goodbye and went to the home of a neighbor. He also 
prayed- that the affirmative matters set up iii his answer and 
cross petition be so treated, and that the s~id Ruth Lester 
Buchanan be summoned to answer .such crofs petition; t~at 
he may be allowed to present such evidence to-µchmg· the clauns 
and charg·es he made; and that upon a hearlng of the entire 
matter the court may afford him the relief p ayed for. 
11. The entire matter was so heard. E · dence ·was pre-
sented, ore tenus, and by depositions of witiiesses. The oral 
evidence was taken on March 21, 22 andi 23r~, and the court, 
after holding it under advisement unti.l the 2j4:th day of June, 
1935, entered its judgment of that date, holqing pursuant to 
sugg·estions of counsel for the father (Record #1885, p. 130), 
that the best interest of the children would! be advanced by 
awardimr 1 
. .., ! 
(a) the custody of the daughter to the faither, and of the 
two sons to the.mother, and that the father be required to pay 
a stated sum to the mother to be expended bf her at her dis-
cretion in the preparatory school education ~f their two said 
sons, which the court fixed at the sum of $375.00 per month 
beg·inning .July 1st, 1935; in addition to I the sum *previ-
8""- ouslv :fixed for the maintenance of the home: 
w I 
(b) ''that the said John R. Buchanan is rJsponsible and is 
required to pay all outstanding bills properly incurred since 
September, 1933, whether by the said John R~ Buchanan or by 
Ruth T Jester Buchanan, or otherwise, in con ection with· the 
education of the two boys and their attendan 'eat th~ Fessen-
den or Hill Schools, respectively, and all ills likewise in-
curred since November 1st, 1933, for their :lothing, as well 
as all medical, hospital, dental, physicians', s ;rgeons' and like 
bills properly and reasonably incurred in pr ~ecting and _pre-
serving the health of said boys to the extent . ot already paid 
by the said John R. Buchanan, as well as a : necessary and 
proper bills heretofore incurred for the clot ~ g of said boys 
and for their traveling and transportation '.xpenses to and 
from schools heretofore attended by them tp the extent not 
alreag.y paid by the said John R. Buchanan, · ut the court not 
I 
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being sufficiently advised as to the amounts of such bills out-
standing and to whom they are "due, and reserving to itself the 
question as to whether said bills so incurred shalLbe amor-
~ed ov~r a given period in the futuFe, doth order that W. N. 
Tiffany'' 
a Special Commissioner be directed to inquire in and report 
to the court the amount of all of such bills so outstanding, 
by whom they were originally incurred, and to whom they 
shall be paid, but before proceeding required notice to. be given 
to the parties (Record #1885, p. 106). 
12. On September 11th, 1935, Commissioner Tiffany re-
turned his report with the evidence upon which it was based, 
and reported debts due by John R. Buchanan, incurred for 
the support, clothing and education of the boys as follows: 
'' The Fessenden School 
The Hill School 
Jasper· J. Stahl 
Athletic Supply Stores 
91: *Dr. William Cabel Moore 
Dr. Charles D. Cole 
Dr~ Arthur L. Morse 
Ruth Lester Buchanan 
$2,010.29 
1,644.87 
60.75 
83.10 
95.00 
15.00 
350.00 
577.19 
·. These were all for bills incurred between June, 1933, and 
July 1st, 1935, and established by uncontradicted evidence re-
ceived without exception (See Pr. Record #1885, p. 109.) 
13. To this ~·eport John R. Buchanan took no exceptiom; 
except as to the bill reported in favor of the Hill School. 
The Court overruled these by it~ order of October 15th, 1935, 
and entered judgments in favor of each of the parties for 
the sums stated above with interest from July 1st, 1935 (Rec-
ord # 1885, p. 114). 
14. The bill of the Hill School amounting to $1,644.87 is 
the judgment at issue in this case. All of the others stanff 
unreversed and unpaid. 
15. By subsequent proceedings in this court so much of thE' 
order of September 29th, 1933, as altered the property rights 
of the parties, and so much of the order of June 24th, 1.935, 
as directed the payment of the additional sum of $375.00 per 
month to Mrs. Buchanan for the support and education of 
her children in the future were held to be null and void (170 
Va. 458), but t4e validity of all of the judgments last above 
mentioned was expressly excluded from consideration by this 
·court in the following words, found at page 471: 
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"the yalidity of the. judg·ments against h. for unpaid ac-
counts is not before us for adjudication.'' 
10* 16. No execution having been issued Pn any of *these 
judgments within twelve months follqwing the entry 
thereof, as required by V. C. Sec. 6477, the sci re f acias above 
mentioned was issued on March 8th, 1939, to itest the question • 
thus reserved (Tr., p. 1). It was duly llerveq on the appellee, 
John R. Buchanan, who appeared in respqnse thereto and 
filed his writteµ objections to the award of execution asserting 
the invalidity of the judgment of October 1,th, 1935; for the 
following reasons (Tr., p. 2): 
First: Because the court was without judsdiction -to enter 
the same in that cause. I 
Second: Because your petitioner was notj a party to that 
-action and never appeared therein by counsel or otherwise. 
· Third: Because of the grounds set forth I by this court i~ 
its final decision and judgment rendered on :¥arch 10th, 1938, 
in Buchanan v. Buchaman, 170 Va. 458. I · · 
Fourth: Because the pleadings in that action were hybrid 
in nature and thoug·h the court below had rul~d that it was at 
law yet the matter was referred to a Commissioner, and the ' 
alleged judgment in question was entered without offering the 
defendant the right of jury trial. j 
Fifth: Because the claim of the petitione)l' with respect to 
this judgment had been reasserted in an actl· on then pending 
in the Circuit Court for Fauquier County and during the. 
pendency of said action it was improper an unlawful to at-
tempt by other proceeding·s to collect fr@m the defendant 
11 • the *alleged claim. I 
This latter ground, however, was apandoned before 
the final judgment was entered, and the mat1ier was heard on 
the scire facias and answer afore said; and 1he entire record 
in Biwhanan v. Bitchanan, including the Rec rd No. 1885. 
After hearing argument the court by its j dgment entered 
the same day, and having- before it the enti record, includ-
ing that certified and presented in Record o. 1885, in this 
court, and the opinion in 170 Va. 458, enter its final judg-
ment holding the said judgment in favor of the appellant to 
be void and refusing the issuance of executi n thereon. 
A transcript of said record is hereby prese ted from which, 
and the said transcript and record No. 188 , the foregoing 
facts will appear. 
I 
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1:2* : * ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
The Court erred in holding the judgment of October 15th 
in favor .of the appellant to be void and in refusing to award 
" the appellant execution thereon. 
(I: ARGUMENT. 
__ The following facts cannot be , controverted: 
First: That this. partic.ular judgment is for tuition and 
educational services and supplies furnished the minor son_, 
James A. Buchanan, during the school year 1934-5, and prior 
to the entry of said judgment. · ~ 
Second: That under the original .contract of May 18th, 
1931, adopted and made a part of the Nevada Decree at the 
special instance of the said Jolm R. Buchanan, and his obli-
gations thereon "to paiall bills for board and tuition in con-
nectjon with the education of said .children while they are at 
boarding school or college'', the appellee agreed for value 
to pay this bill and unless that oblig·ation was validly released 
·it is clear that his responsibility for this bill continues. 
Third: If t4e consent decree of September 29th, 1933, did 
in fact ainend the original contract in this respect, he is still 
responsible for this bill under the express provisions t\}ereof, 
found in paragraph two of the consent order (Record #1885, 
p. 70), in the following express terms : 
"2. The said John R. Buchanan agrees to pay promptly as 
they mature all bills incurred or to be incurred for the 
proper clothing, support, maintenance and education of 
13* the *infant ·children of the parties herein in accordance 
with their station in life." 
The petition of Ruth Lester Buchanan filed in N ovemher, 
1934 (Record #1885, p. 75), after- showing this amendment 
and the obligations ~videnced by it, further alleged on page 
77: 
"The resp,ondent has shown himself utterly disregardful 
of his obligations to pay for the tuition, education -and proper 
maintenance of his two sons, in ·this, that he has repeatedly 
subjected them to great mortification and shame by reason 
of his failure to meet tuition bills at maturity, has failed to 
respond to letters from such . schools calling his attention to - _ 
his delinquency in that regard, and his failure to discuss with 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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1:espondent any future plans for their educaJion and declared 
that he would only do so before Your Honorr '' 
It also alleged the necessity for and the tact the boys had 
been placed in the Hill School with the approval of their 
father (page 78), which approval he subsequently sought to 
avoid. I . 
It also appears from said transcript that John R. Buch-
anan, without objecting to the jurisdiction df the court, filed 
his answer to this petition (which this court in its opinion, 
170 Va., p. 467, treated and discussed as an j'independent ac-
tion at law", and treated it likewise) and prfyed therein that 
his answer thereto be treated as a cross c~~plaint thereto, 
and (page 87 of the Record) not only did not a
1 
eny his liability. 
under the contract, but alleg·ed: . 
I 
"he has made every honest effort available to promptly 
meet his obligations, especially his obligations for the proper 
maintenance and care of his children'', I 
• I ' 
and on page 89 asserted his side of the conttoversy as to the 
entering of his son at the Hill School, and ~lleged: 
• I 
14* •"under the contract as confirmed ~y decree that it 
was his right just as much as petition r's to select the 
school.'' 
It also alleged that the Stuyvesant school was the best he 
could possibly do for the boys, and that nless petitioner 
agreed that the boys g·o to Stuyvesant that he could offer them 
nothing but the Warrenton public school. 
It was on these issues thus presented, aJ.1d after hearing 
evidence, ore tenus, for three days in March, that the court 
by its order of June 24th, 1935 (printed cord #1885, p. 
106), adjudged: 
"Jphn R. Buchanan is responsible and is ~equired to pay 
all outstanding bills properly incurred since : eptember, 1933, 
whether by the said John R. Buchanan or by Ruth· Lester 
Buchanan, or otherwise, in connection with he education of 
the two boys, and their attendance at the F '.ssenden or Hill 
Schools, respectively, and all bills likewis : incurred since 
November 1st, 1933, for their clothing, as we .1 as all medic-.al, 
hospital, dental, physicians', surgeons' and 1i e bills properly 
and reasonably incurred in protecting and preserving the 
health of ·said boys to the extent not already aid by the said 
John R. Buchanan • "" • but • • • not bein · -sufficiently ad-
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vised as to the amounts of such bills outstanding and to whom 
they are due * * * '' and 
ref erred the case to Special Commissioner Tiffany as above 
stated (Print. Record #1885, pp. 106, 107). 
The same record, page 108, shows that Commissioner Tif-
fany complied with all of the provisions of this decree,. after 
giving notice to the parties; that all of the parties appeared 
before him on the 29th day of July, 1935, with their counsel, 
and all testified without objection or· protest of any kind, 
including both John R. Buchanan and his wife, and their son, 
J ~mes A: Buchanan, and the Commissioner returned -
15* with his said *report the depositions so taken without 
exception thereto, with ·exhibits numbered from one to 
eight, of which Exhibit No. 2 is the affidavit of the Hill School 
as to the correctness of the amount and the propriety of the 
charge. This exhibit is now for the first time presented to 
this court with the supplemental transcript and shows the 
propriety of this bill. . · 
It thus appears that there can be in this case no question 
as to the merit of this bill. The only defect attempted to be 
asserted is the purely· technic&-1 one that though the pleadings 
and the evidence clearly presented these issues the Court was 
. withouLjurisdiction because reference was m·ade to the old 
habeas corpus proceeding which though decided had been re-
tained on the stet docket, and was asked to be beard in con-
nection w~th that case. There is no question that this last 
petition and cross petition of John R. Buchanan has been 
heard and decided by a court of general jurisdiction, with 
jurisdiction of the person, of the parties, and of the subject 
·matter. 
It is· respectfully submitted that the question now to be 
determined by this court is not whether the rendition of these 
judgments at the time and under these ci:rcumstances and con-
ditions was erroneous and therefore subject to reversal on 
appeal, bu~ only ~hether the court had jurisdiction of the 
subject matter (which depends on statute and not upon what 
the pleading calls itself) and of the parties which is acquired 
i. by service of process or voluntary appearance. 
These are the ·questions presented by the ground of 
16* *objection fl.led below and these are the points which 
will be discussed. 
There is no merit in the first ground alleged that the cour·t 
was without jurisdiction to enter the judgment in that case. 
·The Cour~ jn its opinion, 170 Va. 458, after passing on the 
validity of the consent order. of September 29th, 1933, anq. 
holding it void in so far as it dealt with the property rights 
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of the parties, because that was a habeas Jrpus proceedilig 
only and subject to its peculiar rules, tool up the question 
of the effect of the petition filed in November, 19'34, and at 
page 467 said: . · · ] 
'' The second major question presented is whether, in an 
independent action at law, instituted by mifor children and 
a divorced wife, the court has jurisdiction Olj power to compel 
a father to pay out of his income a definite i sum each month 
for the futur,e support, maintenance and ~ducation of his 
minor children * * • . '' I 
. This court not only confined its discussiln to that single 
·point and held that this petition was an independent proceed-
ing at law, and that no court of law had jurisdiction to enter 
such a judgment, said at page 471: f 
'' As John R. Buchanan was held in conte~pt only for his 
failure to pay his divorced wife the sum ofl $375.00 monthly 
under this order, which is brought under re'\Hew by this writ 
of error,_ the validity of the judgments again11t him for unpaid 
accounts is not before us for adjudication.' · 
and as further emphasizing this distinction the court said, 
page 470: i 
'' This is not an action at law to recoveir damages for a 
- breach of contract. The petition contatns no allegation 
17• that John *R. Buchanan failed to pay Rµth Lester Buch-
anan the sum of $375.00 per month f~r the establish-
ment of a home suitable for herself and th~ children. * * * 
There are paragraphs alleging failure to pay obligations in-
curred by the mother and boys for the benefit of the latter.'' 
From this point on the opinion deals exc . sively with the 
question of the validity of that portion of t . order of June, 
1936, requiring prepayment of fixed sums for · utitre expenRes, 
independent of contract, based solely on c 1nmon law obli~ 
gations. 
'.'The jurisdiction * * * to enforce the co on law obliga-
tion of the father for future maintenance an education waR 
invoked * * * {page 472). _ 
"The judgment of the court onits commo law side, so far 
as it attempted, in this action by minors to co pel their father 
to provide them an income out of his estate for their fu,tiire 
support and education is void.'' 
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""If it be contended that they have property rights in the 
contract between their father and mother, the court did not. 
attempt to enforce these contractual obligations as to fufo,r,e 
expenditures'' ( page 47 4). 
'' * * • It is further contended that the plan to compel the 
father to fulfill his com.nio,n law obligation for the fut'll,re sup-
port and education of his sons was adopted at the suggestion 
1of the father's attorney" (page 475) .. 
"The contract between mother and father is not before 
this court for construction" (page 477). 
'' The trial court had jurisdiction upon the petition filed 
by the mother, even if improper parties were joined, to de-
termine the custody of the children. It had no jurisdiction 
or power, in the procedure adopted, to determine the ques-
1tion of compensation for the future maintenanc~ and educa-
tion of the two boys '' ( pages 4 77 -8). · 
These extracts would make it sufficiently clear not only 
that this court did not, when this case was here before, fore-
close the .question of the validity of any of these eight judg-
ments against the appellant, but on- the contrary expressly 
negatived such a possibility, and thus negatived the third 
groun4 of opposition assigned by the appellee, that the 
18* question here *presented has been foreclosed by the de~ 
cision of this case, 170 Va., supra. 
This court did hold that this was '' an independent action 
at law". It cannot be contended that the Circuit Court on its 
law side, 1.s not a court of general jurisdiction,- and there-
fore has-jurisdiction of the subject matter, of every suit aris-
ing between parties within its territorial jurisdiction. 
·'' General jurisdiction is such as extends to all controversies, 
which may be brought before a court within the legal bounds 
of rights and remedies, 15 C. J. 726, Sec. 14.'' 
. ''It is called 'general' because it applies to all subjects em-
braced within the objects of its general organization and to 
all parties who can be reached by its proces~ and be bound by 
its power. Root v. McFerr·in, 37 Miss. 17, 75 Am. Dec. 49. '' 
"General Jurisdiction in law and equity is jurisdiction of 
every kind that a court can possess, of the person, subject 
inatter, territorially and generally. ~ouvier L. D. '' 
'' As a general proposition jurisdiction does not rest on 
averments in pleading. Sufficiency of pleadings is not a 
jurisdictional test, and if the pleadings contain sufficient mat-
i 
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ter to challenge the attention oj the court, a~d such a case .is 
thereby presented as to authorize the court to deliberate a~d 
act this is· sufficient for the purpose of conferring jurisdic-
tion. 15 C. J. 733, Sec. 32." ! 
. "T~ere is no principle of law better settle4 than that every 
act of a ~ourt of competent jurisdiction shalll be presumed· to 
have been rightly done, till the contrary appears. • * * Every 
matter· adjudicated becomes a part of their record, which 
theµceforth pro·ves itself, without referring !to the evidence 
on which it .has been adjudged "" * * . '' · 
i 
"Th~t .some sanctity .should be given· to j~dicial proceed-
ings, some time limited beyond which th~y should not be.ques-
tioned • • • cannot be denied. I · · _ 
"It ·is among the elementary principles of ihe coirirrion law 
that whoever would complain of *the proceedings of a 
· 19* court must do it in such 'time as not tt> injure his ad~: 
versary by unnecessary delay in t~e assertion of his 
rights. If he objects to the mode in which he is brought'into 
court, he must do it before he submits to the process adopted. 
* • * But if he pleads to the action generally,i all irregularity 
is waived, and the court can decide only on the rights of the 
parties to the subject matter of controversy;: their judgment 
is conclusive, unless it appears on the recor~ that the plain-
tiff has no title to the thing demanded. *' * * '.Oi(}1!Yl,gs v. Tier-
nan, 10 Peters 447, 9 L. Ed. 489." I 
"If the jurisdiction of the court in a civil case is not al-
leged in the 'pleadings the judgment is not a nullity, but 
though erroneous is obligatory as one, and in a proceeding 
in rem, an erroneous judgment binds the property on which 
it acts, it will not bind it the less because the er;ror is apparent. 
Grignor v. Astor, 2 How. 319, 342, 11 Law Ed. 283, 292." -
" A decree of a court of competent jnrisl iction is con-
clusive in a collateral proceeding, unless the e be some suf-
ficient ground of fraurl or surpri.c;e to entitle t e injured party 
to relief in another suit. Alvin v. Saimders, 3 Va. 208. '' 
'' A judgment cannot be questioned collater ly for an error 
committed in the exercise of jurisdiction. !ortgage Trust · 
C: of Pen,n. v. Redd, 88 P. 473, 38 Col. 458; 8 . R. A. (N. S. 
1215;120 Am. St. Rep. 132), (cited with appro al by this court 
in Shelf on v. 8 '!jilnor, 126i Va. 633)." j . · · 
'' Mistakes, errors and irregularities, altho gh they' might 
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reverse a case on review are not jurisdictional, and will not 
render the judgment void. Pinnacal Gold 1Jlli1iin.<J Qo. v. Post, 
131 P. 431, 54 Col. 451. '' 
''No order which a court is empowered under any cfrcum-
stances in the course of a proceeding over which it has juris-
diction to make can be treated as a nullity merely because it 
was made improvidently, or in a manner not warranted by law 
or the previous state of the case. The only question in such 
a case is, had the court or tribunal the power under any cir-
cumstances to make the order or perform the act.'' 
Mortgage Trust Co1npany of Penn. v. Redd,- 88 Pac. 473, 8 
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1215. 
In Shelton v. Sydnor, 126 Va. 625, 628, this court said: 
20• *"Jurisdiction it is said is the power to adjudicate a 
case upon the merits, and dispose of it as justice may 
require. The Resolute, 168 U. S. 437, 439, 42 L. Ed. 533, 534. 
This necessarily involves the idea that there must be juris-
diction of the subject matter of the litigation and also of the 
parties thereto. If either is wanting the resulting judgment 
is void. But the rights and powers of the parties as to the 
method of acquiring the two kinds of jurisdiction are not the 
same. Jurisdiction of the subject matter can only be acquired 
by virtue of the Constifittion or of some statute. Neither the 
consent of the parties nor the waiver, nor acquiescence can 
confer it. Nor can the right to object for want of it be lost 
by acquiescensc, neglect, estoppel or in any other manner. 
It is the right of the state to say to what classes of cases 
its courts shall have jurisdiction.'' 
It is equally true jurisdiction of a subject matter onlv con-
ferred by statute cannot be divested except by statute: 
It cannot be questioned that under the provisions of Sec-
tion 5890 of the Code that the Circuit Courts did have juris-
diction of the class of cases here presented. It provides: 
'' They shall have orig-inal and general jurisdiction of a11 
cases in chancery and civil cases at law.'' 
In Moran v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 148 Va. 272~ and South-
ern Sand, ·etc., Co. v. Massaponax Sand Corporation, 145 Yn. 
317, construing this section, this court said: 
'' This is 'potential jurisdiction' which, after yalid service 
i 
i 
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~f process on the parties, gives the court' ac ive' jurisdiction 
and empowers it to hear the case and enter _ valid judgment 
therein.'' / 
I 
These authorities seem to dispose of the question as to 
whether or not the Circuit Qourt had jurisdibtion of the sub-
ject matter. 
Shelton v. Sydnor, 126 Va. 625, then takes up the question 
of jurisdiction of the parties : 
"The rule with reference to jurisdiction Jv:er the persons 
of the litigants is not quite so strict. ~e 'due process' 
21 * clauses of the Federal *and State Con~titution require 
notice and an opportunity to be heard, !but the litigants 
have rig·hts which they may waive if the~ choose, and if 
waived in a case in which they have the right to waive the 
judgment will be held valid * * *. '' I 
I 
'' Every intendment is made to support the judgment, an~ ·-
the rule is that nothing shall be intended to bel out of the jitris_- ~-
diction of a superior court, that is, a co11rt of general juris-
diction-but that which specially appears tq be so. Broms 
Leg. Max. 952; 1 Smith's Leading Cases, notes to Crepps v. 
Durden.'' I • 
I 
"The Circuit Court of Hanover County isl a Court of gen-
eral jurisdiction, and although the appeal jn this class of 
cases is given by a separate statute * * * t»ere is the same 
presumption in favor of its correctness in the one case as 
the other. Mortgage .Trust Co. v. Redd, 38 ·<Vo. 458, 120 Am. 
St. Rep. 132.'' I 
I 
See Commonwealth v. Beavers, 150 Va. 3$, where this is 
thoroug·hly discussed. Not only is it so, bu , Virginia Code, 
Section 6331, expressly provides in respect o ordinary ap-
peals taken in due time : ! 
I 
''No judgment or decree shall be arre·sted r reversed «= • • 
for any defect, imperfection or omission i the pleadings, 
which could not be regarded on demurrer ; r for any other 
defect, imperfection or omission in the rec rd, or for any 
error committed on the trial where it plain~ appears from 
the record and the evidence given at the trial that the parties 
have had a fair trial on the merits, and su 'stantial justice 
has been reached. '' 
! . 
and Section 6332 provides: 
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; .'' * • * and when it appears that there was a full and fair 
hearing on the merits, and that substantial justice has b.een 
done, a decree shall not be reversed for., want of a replica-
tion • • • nor shall it be reversed for any informality in the 
proceedings, at the instance of a party who has taken depo-
sitions.'' 
Judge Burke, in his address on the Code of 1919, Raid: 
'' A substantial change was made in ·the statute of J eofails., 
Under the revision it seems almost impossible for a case to he 
reversed on any mere technicality. Judgments are allowed 
to stand when fairly rendered on the merits if substantial jus-
tice has been reached.'' 
22* •In Virginia R., etc., Co. v. Smith, 129 Va. 269, ·'277, 
at page 306, this court, in construing this section, saicl: 
_ ''The revisors, in Section 6331 of .the Code of 1919, in keep-
ing with the modern trend of legislative and judicial poliey, 
added a new clause to the old section ( Code 1887, Sec. 3449) 
and the statute now provides that 'no judgment or decree shall 
be reversed * ~ '* for any error committed on the trial where 
it ·plainly appears from the ev:idence given at the trial that. 
the parties have had a fair trial on the merits, and substan-
tial justice has been done'. It is our purpose to vitalize this 
provision in its application and administration.'' 
, .A f ortio.ri no such defects can be asserted collaterally. 
It appears that this petition, treated as '' an independent 
action at law" by the opinion of this court, alleged the facts 
µ.nder which these boys had been entered in the Hill School, 
alleged the contract of 1931, adopted by the Nevada Court, 
as a part of the divorce decree and its attempted amendment 
by the consent decree of September, 1933, under either or both 
of which the plaintiff was responsible contractually for this 
identical service. The facts alleged showed the appellee 's 
failure to comply with the provisions of either contract and 
prayed that the appellant be required to comply with his ob-
ligations, and that he be summoned to answer the allegations 
of the petition, and that evidence be heard.· The appellant 
himself appeared without objection and answered said peti-
tion, admitted many of the allegations of this petition, treated 
as· an· independent action at law, and concluded with a 
prayer: 
I 
; 
I 
. l 
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. "That the affirmative matters set up in ~his answer and 
cross petition may be so treated and th .. t the said Ruth 
23• Lester Buchanan may be summoned ·to answer ·*such 
cross petition; that he may be allowed Ito present such 
eyidence touching the claims and charges he niakes; and that 
upon a hearing of the entire matter the court!may afford him 
the relief prayed for." I 
It further appears from the record that isuch a hearing 
was granted him; that the court heard all of ~he evidence of-
fered by all parties and referred this particular question to 
a Commissioner, and that this Commissione~\ after notice to 
the parties, heard •an the evidence of the ~ppellee and re-
ported to the court his findings, with the evid~nce upon which 
it was based, which resulted in this judgment, not for fut~u-·e 
expenditures but for past expenditures, a matt,er wholly within 
the jurisdiction of a court of law, especially when based upon 
contract, as this obligation was, and the -judgment was en-
~ered accordingly and never appealed from.I_ 
It is clear therefore that this was a matter+ over which the 
-court had jurisdiction of the subject matter; !that the parties 
were heard on the very issues covered by the order, and the 
9ommissioner's report and the judgments firtally entered. i..: · 
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The second ground of objection stated i~ that the Hill 
School was not a party to the action in which the alleged judg·-
ment was entered, and never appeared therein by counse] or 
otherwise. I 
24* *It is submitted that this conclusionl is also without 
· merit. It will be seen that the liability ftjr these past-due 
bills arose under contract. So far as this i:;,articular bill i~ 
concerned it is immaterial whether it arose u der the originnl 
contract of May, 1931, or the abortive ame dment of 1933, 
the result is the same. He was liable under oth the original 
contract and under the terms of the abortive ;amendment. It 
is further apparent that this contract being ne made by the 
mother, th~ pnrty-to it, for the benefit of hers lf, a part71, oth-
ers namied not parties, including her childre · and others, not 
named, including the appellant, that at co mon law, the 
mother alone was entitled to sue at law. J nes v. Thomas, 
21 Gratt. 96; Rose v. Millne, 12 Leigh ~04; Da,vis v. Como., 
12 Gratt. 151; Clark.c;on v. Dodnidge, 14 Gr tt. 42; Garland 
v. Ri:chmond, 4 Rand. 266. Though under t e provisions of 
Virginia Code, Section 5143, as amended : 
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"if a covenant or promise be made for the benefit, in whole 
or in part of a person with whom it is not made, or with_ whom 
it is made jointly with others, such person, whether named 
in the instrument or not, may maintain in his own name any 
· ·action thereon which he might maintain in case it had been 
made with him only," 
the Hill School mig·ht have maintained an action at law on 
this contract under this section. AettUt,, etc., Co. v. Earle-Lams-
dell C'o., 142 Va. 435; Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Mason, 138 Va. 142. 
This did not prevent the mother from maintaining her suit 
for the benefit of all. Jones v. Thonias, 21 Gratt. 96, 102. 
25* *The fact is that this action at la,v was instituted by 
the obligee, the party who made it, against the obligor 
thereunder for the benefit, not only of herself but of all of 
the other parties to it, and she would have had the perfect 
right to have instituted said suit for the benefit of these other 
parties, and judgments could have been so rendered. 
w_ e have been unable to find any Virginia case in which 
this precise question is discussed and yet the uniform prac-
tice in Virginia has been in conformity with these principles. 
The question is, however, discussed in 47 C. J., Section 
31, under the title ''PARTIES'', from which we quote ex-
tracts as follows: 
'.'The general rnle at common law is that every action must 
be brought in the name of the person whose legal right bas 
been invaded or infringed. It is a general principle applicable 
to all actions at law that they must be brought by the ner-
son whose legal rights have been affected, or, in other wo~ds, 
who has the legal interest in the cause of action. 47 C. J., p. 
22, Section 31. '' · 
"Section 32. LEGAL TITLE. It is an established prin-
ciple at common law that an action in a court of law for the 
enforcement of a right must be in the name of the person 
having the leg·al title. It is a general doctrine which cannot 
be controverted that the action must be brought fo the name 
of the person in whom the legal title resides. The rule is 
well settled that the party seeking redress at common law 
- must be the party legally, and not merely equitably entitled 
thereto. . The action may be maintained only in the name of 
a person who bases his right to recovery upon a legal title, 
the legal right of action lies in such a person and in no one 
.else. The test which the common law applies is that of the . 
strict legal title in its entirety; in th·e view of the common 
law procedure he who is clothed with the legal title has the 
. I 
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exclusive right of action, although the entire looneficial inter-
est with the equitable title is in someone elst '' 
i 
26* *''At common law no one but the legal owner of a 
chose in action can prosecute an actiori at law for its 
recovery. A suit upon a ~hose in action mu~t be brought in 
the name of the holder of the legal title; S'1Ch a person is 
the only proper plaintiff in an action instituted thereon.'' 
"The relator must have the legal title, and one having a 
mere equitable rig·ht is not entitled to sue in that character.~' 
47 C. J., p. 22, Sections 33 and 34. i 
In Section 34 it is said: 
''Thus plaintiff must have a legal interest in an action on 
a contract, express or implied, and the rule ! that ordinarily 
only a party to a contract has such a legal interest cannot be 
evaded by bringing what is really an action for breach of con-
tract in the form of an action for tort. Flirther, the rule 
has been applied as to plaintiffs in action for breach of a· 
contract under seal or a covenant, actions on[bills and notes, 
actions on agent's contracts, action ex delicto, g·enerf,l.lly." 
And in Section 36, page 23, it -is said: 
'' The common law looked to the entire legal interest, and .... 
did not directly recognize the beneficial interest or equitable 
title.'' ! 
Section 37, page 23, it is said: 
'' An action may be maintained by a persori in whom tber·e 
exists the entire leg·al interest in a cause of action. In other 
words, a legal title is sufficient for the maintenance of an 
action at law. If plaintiff, suing at law, has i a legal title, in 
whatever form, to the cause of action which le has pleaded, 
he has a sufficient remedial interest. Wher the per~on in 
whose name the action is broug·ht has the 1 gal title to the 
subject matt~r thereof, he may adopt the ac ioi:i as Ms own, 
although it was originally brought in his n me by a third 
p~rson who later repudiates his connection therewith." 
Section 44 : I 
I 
. '' The person who is vested with a right of action on a given 
eause of action may sue upon it in his own 1name, although 
the whole beneficial interest is in another. On! the other hand, 
• 
· 1 
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he who_ is, without a right of action on a given cause of action 
cannot assert this cause in his own name, even when the whole 
beneficial interest is in him.'' · 
27* *It is out of this common law rule that independent 
of statute suits for "use plaiutiffs''-that is a suit in 
the name of an assignor for the use of an assignee-a rose. 
Dealing with this subject this is said in 47 C. J ., p. 25, Sec-
tion 45: 
· '' However lack of remedial interest in plaintiff has heen 
held not to raise a j-urisdfotional qu,e.<;tion, and a failure to re-
cover on a claim due to another is not due to any defect in the 
jurisdiction of the Court in which the action is brought, but is 
due to the fact that the c·ourt in the full exercise of its jurisdic-
tion, determines that he has no title to the asserted demand, 
and has in consequence no right to recover.'' 
Thus, the mere fact that a suit was brought not in the 
name of the holder of the legal title, but in the name of the 
equitable owner. was not a quest.ion that would affPot the 
fttrisdiotion of the court, over the subject matter or the per-
son, but would merely, if permitted, evidence an erroneous 
exercise of jurisdiction, which could only be remedied by ap- . 
peal, or writ of error, taken within due time. 
It is out of such a situation that the practice of snits in 
the name of the holder of the legal title to a chose in action 
against the obligor, for the benefit of an assignee or other 
beneficiary a.rose, at common law. This subject is dealt with 
in 47 C. J., p. 25, Section 45, where it is said: 
· ''Where the beneficial ownership and the legal title to a 
chose in action or tangible property are separated, the bene-
ficial owner's rights may be protected by the bringing of an 
action to his use in the name of the legal owner as nominal or 
legal plaintiff." · 
And in. Section 49 : 
''In an action in the name of one person for the use of an-
other, the right of recovery is founded solely upon the 
28* claim of the legal plaintiff, *the right ·to maintain the 
action does not depend upon the interest which the u·se-
plaintiff may have in the result. If the legal plaintiff him-
self has no cause of action he cannot recover for the benefit 
of another.'' 
,' 
- The Hill School v. John R. Buchahan. 21 
. In dealing with the right of the legal owJer it is further 
said: . r 
"The legal owner may bring his action for ~e use of what~ 
ever person he may choose. The legal owne11 's selection of a 
use-plaintiff is a matter with which defendart is not in any 
way concerned. So far as defendant is concerned it is not 
necessary that the use-plaintiff should in fabt have any in· 
terest or connection, otherwise with the subject matter of the 
action. 47 C. J., p. 26, Sec. 50. '' I 
I 
I 
"The beneficial owner has the right to br¥1g an action to 
his use in the name of- the legal owner, or,f fter his death, 
in the name of his administrator, without cons nt or authority, 
and even against the expressed wish of th legal pfaintiff. 
The legal owner has not the right to ref use the use of his 
name as plaintiff by th_e b-eneficial owner, helj cannot prevent 
the use of his name * • • . '' 
" • • • Where the legal owner has a cause ~faction againsl 
defendant, it is immaterial so far as defendant is concerned, 
whether the use-plaintiff has any interest orl not, that being 
a matter which concerns the legal and use p~aintiffs and not 
defendant. If the consent of the legal owner; is not obtained 
at the offset of the action, his consent at a la1er stage relates 
back to the commencement of- the action, and ~atifies it. * * ~ 
The fact that the beneficial owner acquired\ his interest in 
·the property involved iu the litigation after the cause of ac-
tion arose does not bar the right to maintain the action in 
the 1ega1 owner's name.,, I 
i 
'i 
'' Sec. 52: It has been held that there are 
1
three classes of ' 
cases in which there may be a use-plaintiff (1) Where a con-
tract is made between the legal plaintiff land de~endant, 
largely for the benefit of other parties who ~ay or may not 
be known at the time it is made, the legal p intiff being in-
terested only because it will aid in securin a proper per-
formance.'' 
It is submitted that this action comes cle rly within this 
·classification. 
And on page 29, 57 C. J. : 
29* *''The use-plaintiff, being regarded a the real plain-
tiff, is entitled to control the action, an a court of law 
will not permit the nominal plaintiff to co :trol the -action. 
However, it has been held that the only cases in which a third 
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person- has~ the exclusive ~ight to the co~trol of an action ~t 
law are where he has acquired the whole mterest of the nom1.;. 
nal plaintiff, either by his voluntary act or by operation of 
law." 
It is perfectly manifest from the proceedings in this cause 
that the nominal plaintiff to the claim here considered wished, 
instead of these judgments being- entered in her own name 
for their benefit, that they should be entered directly for the 
benefit of the real beneficiaries. · 
As above stated, we have been unable to find any Virginia 
case which discusses this particular question, but this seems 
to have ·been the course pursued and approved in Wallop's 
A.dmr. v. Scarbitrgh, 5 Gratt. 1, where it is r~cited that in 
May, 1830, a judgment was rendered in the Circuit Court of 
Accomac in favor of Henry F. Finney, as assig·nee of Skinker 
Wallop against John W. Downing, George D. Downing and 
Samuel Bloxton, and his wife, as devisees of William Down-
ing, in the sum of $700.00 with interest and costs, to be levied 
tm ·certain assets confessed by them and th~t an extent was 
awarded to haye the assets delivered to plaintiff at their ap-
praised annual value. The extent was issued on the judg-
ment and was levied, and the lands in the possession of Down-
ing and his wife were deliv_ered to the plaintiff · at an ap- , 
praised value of $67.10 per annum. No appeal was taken from 
this judgme~t, but in May, 1840, George P. Scarburgh and 
Eliza R. and William G. Riley, infan~s, by their next friend, 
gave notice that they would move to quash the -extendi 
30* fac-ias, issued on the *judgment, and on motion o_f the 
parties quashed the execution and the inquisition takPn 
thereon. Yet the Court of Appeals reversed that judgment. 
a thing they could not have done, and would not have done if 
the judgment had been void for lack of jurisdiction of the 
subject matter, or of the parties. 
The Section, which is now Section 5143 of the Code, was 
incorporated for the first time in the Code of 1849. 
The judgment of the court in ref erring the instant case to 
a Commissioner in fact invited such parties to come in. 
Neither party objected to the procedure proposed. The fur-
ther fact is that the Hill School accepted this invitalion and 
did file its affidavit, under the provisions of that decree, and 
thereby became a party to this litig·ation and accepted this 
judgment. It is, therefore, apparent that the Hill School 
thereby became a party, submitted itself to the jurisdiction 
of the court, and was bound by that decree to the same extent 
that the appellant and Mrs. Buchanan herself was bound. 
I 
i 
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•THE QUESTIONS HERE ARE N~T RES 
ADJUDICAT A. I . ,. 
The third ground of objection-that by reason of·what this 
court said in its final decision in Buchanan v~ Bitcha'fl,an, 170 
Va. 458, the appellant herein is precluded from asserting his 
tudgment-has been sufficiently dealt with in ,~onnection with. 
the first ground of opposition : , 
I 
"The validity of the judgments "" ,)I, * for unpaid accounts 
is not before us for adjudication.'' I 
Buchanan v. Buchaman, 170 Va. 458, 4 71. i 
I 
This question is now for the :first time presepted, and it will 
·b€ recalled that this court even refused permfssion to one of 
these judgment creditors to file a petition 'i amicus curia" 
in that case, presumably on the ground that its rights could 
not be injuriously affected by any judgment that might be 
entered in that case. ! 
32* ·The fourth ground: That the matt~r was referred 
to a Commissioner and the alleged judgment in ques- · 
tion was entered without off erirtl} the defenda~t his right of a 
jury trial is equally without merit. As has ~eretof orP bee1i 
pointed out no- such question was raised in tµe cou·rt below~ 
No question of a jury trial was broached either in the p_eti-
tion or in the appellee 's answer, treated as al cross-petition; 
the fact is that the court did hear -all evidelice offered and 
entered a decree accordin~ to the facts of the case ; and this 
was done after full hearin~ and without anf such questi011 
being raised or broached in any way and it is now too latP 
after final judgment for the plaintiff to clai1* that his right 
of trial by jury was denied him. I . 
Virginia Code, Section 6012, provides : I 
"In any case unless one of the parties dfmand that the 
case be tried by a jury the whole matter of la . and fact may 
be 'determined and judgment given by the cou t. '' 
No such demand having been made at the p oper time it is 
too late now to assert it. 1 
In Collier v. Hiden, 120 Va. 453, at page 457, this court, con-
struing this section, then Section 3166 of Po ard 's Code . of 
· 1914, said : 
'' By virtue of the provisions of Section 3 66 of the Code 
of Virginia (Pollard's Code) a trial by ju is waived if 
neither plaintiff nor defendant d,emand such a trial.'' 
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In Jayne v. Kane, 140 Va. 27, the same construction was. 
put on this section-That was an attachment proceeding, in 
respect· to. which Section 6048 of the Code provides: 
33* *' 'On a motion, when an issue of fact is joined, and 
either party desire it, or when in the opinion of the 
court it is proper, a jury shall be empaneled, unless the case 
be one in which the recovery is limited to an amount not 
greater than twenty dollars.'' 
In that case the record did not show that either party had 
asked for a jury, but the court had apparently on f ts own 
motion, but without objection from either party, ordered a 
jury trial. On appeal the losing party claimed that this ac-
tion of the court constituted error. In passing on that ques-
tion the court said at page 33: 
"While it is true that Section 6012 of the Code provides: 
'In any case, unless one of the parties demand that the case 
be tried by a jury, the whole matter of law and of fact may 
be heard and determined, and judgment ·given by the court, 
we are of the opinion that this statute is not intended to abro-
gate a trial by jury. It is only intended to bestow upon 
parties litigant the 1·ight to waive a determination of the 
issue joined by a submission to a jury and to have their rights 
determined by the Court. In any event the record fails to 
disclose that this objection was made before the jury was 
· empaneled and it is but fair to assume that there was com-
plete acquiescence by both litigants in the mode in which 
the case was proceeded with.'' 
This is · the exact circumstance in this case. 
The appellant waived his right to a trial by jury in that 
proceeding and cannot now in a collateral proceeding reas-
sert it. 
34* *The fifth ground-that there was another suit pend-
ing involving the same action-was waived at the trial. 
CONCLUSION. 
It is respectfully submitted that in the light of the undis-
puted facts in this case the court below erred to the prejudice 
of the petitioner in refusing an award of execution on the·· 
judgment aforesaid. 
Your petitioner, therefore, respectfully prays that tl1e rec-
ord in Buchanan v. B1tchanan, ·No. 1885, be inspected with and 
as a part of the transcript herewith presented; that it ·be· 
I 
I 
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aw8rded a writ. of error to the final judgmeit of Al!r~l 7th, 
1939, as aforesaid; that the same be placed upon the privileged 
docket for an' early hearing to the end tha~ speedy justic~ 
so long delayed may be awarded it, and th~t after hearing 
the judgment of the lower court be reversed and annulled, 
and that final judgment be entered in this cahse with appro-
priate instructions. i . 
It also prays that its counsel be afforded! opportunity to 
support this petition for an appeal by oral! argument, and 
when allowed that it be treated as her opening brief. 
·Counsel for the appellant further avers th~t the foregoing 
petition will be filed with Hon. George L. Bt.owning, Associ-
-ate Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, at 
Orange, Virginia, and that a copy of the fo:tegoing petition 
was on the 23rd day of June, 1939, tnailed to 1Y.(r • 
. 35* •Thomas B. Gay of Counsel of record for John_R. Buch-
anan at Richmond, Virginia. ! 
; 
. Respectfully submitte1, 
I 
THE HILL SCHOOL, 
By JNO. S. BARBO~, Counsel. 
JOHN .S. BARBOUR, 
Counsel for the Appellant. 
The undersigned, ·John S. Barbour, an attorney duly li-
censed and practicing in the Supreme Court of A.ppe·als or 
Virginia, hereby certifies that in his opinion there is error in 
the judgment complained of in the foregoipg petition and 
that the same should be reviewed and reversed. 
i 
I 
JNO. S. BARBOUR. 
! 
Received 6-24-39. 
G. L.B. 
Writ of error allowed. Bond $500.00. 
GEORGE L. B OWNING. 
9-6-39. 
Received Sept. 7, 1939. 
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RECORD. 
VIRGlNIA: 
In the Circuit ·Court for the County of :B1auquier. 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of the County of lt,auquier, 
at the Courthouse of said County on 19 day of June, 1939: 
Be It Remembered, that heretofore, to-wit: on the 8th day 
of March, 1939, there was sued out of the Clerk's Office of 
said Court, a scire f acias in favor of the Hill School of Potts-
town, Pennsylvania, against John R. Buchanan, in the fol-
lowing words and figures : 
To the Sheriff of said County: Greeting 
Whereas, The Hill School of Pottstown, Pennsylvania, 
in our Circuit Court of Fauquier County, at the Courthouse 
thereof, on the 15th day of October, 1935, by judgment of 
said Court in a certain suit at law therein pending styled 
Buchanan v. Buchanan, recovered against John R. Buchanan 
the sum of Sixteen Hundred and Forty-four Dollars aud 
Eighty-seven Cents ($1,644.87) whereof the said John R. 
Buchanan is convict as appears from record, and Whereas, 
now on behalf of the said The Hill School of Pottstown, 
Pennsylvania, it is said that although judgment be given as 
aforesaid yet execution thereof still remains to be had, but 
more than a year has past since the judgment: Therefore at 
the instance of the said The Hill School of Pottstown, Pa. 
We Command You, in the name of the Commonwealth of Vir• 
ginia, that you make known to the said J·ohn R. Buchanan that 
he be before our Circuit Court of the said Fauquier County 
at the Courthouse thereof on the first dav of the next March 
Term thereof, (March 27th, 193°'9), to show cause, if 
page 2 ~ any he can, why the said The Hill School of Potts-
town, Pennsylvania, ought not to have execution 
against him, the said John R. Buchanan, for the sum of 
$1,644.87 aforesaid, with interest from the 1st day of July. 
1935, until paid, according to the judgment aforesaid, and 
that you have then and there this writ and make return how 
you have executed the same. Witness, T. E. Bartenstein, 
Clerk of our said Court at the Courthouse thereof in the 
-- ~ 
.\ 
! 
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r. 
County and State aforesaid, this the 8 day hf· March, 1939, 
and in the 163 year of the Commonwealth. 1 • 
T. E. BARTENSTEIN, Clerk. 
I 
GROUNDS Olt, OPPOSITION THERETO FILED BY 
JOHN R. BUCHANAN ON 27 MARCH, 1939. 
As grounds for his opposition to the application of The 
Hill School of Pottstown, Pennsylvania, fo~the issuance of 
execution against him, upon an alleged jud , ent entered in 
the above entitled ,cause on October 15., 1935.,. which said ap-
plication is referred to in a show cause ord~T issued by the . 
Glerk of the Circuit Court of Fauquier County, Virginia, un-
der date of March 8, 1939, the defendant, J o~n R. Buchanan, 
comes and says: (1) That the alle~ed judgment of October 
15, 1935, referred to in said show cause order, is null and 
void, because this Honorable Court was without power or. 
jurisdiction to render the same in the then' pending a<!tion 
· styled Buchanan v. Buchanan, which said action was a habea.s 
corp·us proceedings. (2) That the alleged judgment of Oc-
tober 15, 1mm, is null and void, and cannot be enforced or col-
lected by or on behalf of The Hill School, because said School 
was not a party to said action in which the alleged judgment 
in its favor was entered, and has µever appeared 
page 3 ~ therein by counsel or otherwise. (3) That said al-
leged judgment of October 15., 1935, is null and void, 
because this Honorable Court was without power or juris-
diction to enter the same for the reasons • and upon the 
grounds set forth by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Yir-
ginia in the final decision and judgment rendered on March 
,10, 1938, in the case of Bitcha.1nan. v. Buchlllllan, (Reported in 
170 Va., at page 458). (4) That the alleged judgment of Oc-
tober 15, 1935, is null and void because the mdde of procedure 
prescribed by law· for the assertion and e orcement of a 
monetary claim against this defendant, und r the facts and 
circumstances, was not followed or complied )h. The plead· 
ings filed by the plaintiff, Ruth Lester Bucha an., were hybrid 
in nature, entirely inappropriate for either n action at law 
or a bill in equity. The Hill School was nev a party to the 
proceedings. This Honorable Court ruled hat said action 
in which the alleged judgment of October 1 , 1935, was en-
tered was "an action at law". Yet the mattler was referred 
to a Commissioner, and the alleged judgmentjin question was 
entered on the Commissioner's Report, withoit affording· the 
I 
I 
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defendant the right of jury trial prescribed by law. (5) That. 
the claim of The Hill School in the sum of $1,644.87, with re-
spect to which it is asserted that a judgment against the de-
fendant was obtained on October 15, 1935, has been reasserted 
in an action now pending in this Honorable Court under the 
style of Ruth Lest~r Buchanan v. John R. Buchanan, which 
said action was instituted on the .... day of September, 1938, 
and to which the defendant has filed a demurrer and a spe-
cial plea, upon which argument has been had and with re-
spect to which this Honorable Court has taken no action; and 
that during the pendency of said action, it is ini-
page 4 ~ proper and unlawful to attempt by other and further 
legal proceedings to collect from, the defendant the 
.same alleged claim. Wherefore, the defendant prays that no 
execution may be issued upon said alleged judgment of Oc-
tober 15, 1935. 
ORDER OF COURT ENTERED 7 APRIL, 1939. 
This cause came on this day to be heard upon the scire facias 
issued by the Clerk of this Court on the 8th day of March, 
1939, at the instance of the Hill School for an award of exe-
cution on the judgment of this Court in its favor, heretofore 
entered herein, in the sum of $1,644.87, and returnable to the 
first day of this Term of the Court, which writ was returned 
duly executed, and the defendant, John R. Buchanan having 
appeared and filed his objections in writing to the granting of· 
said execution, was argued by counsel. On consideration 
whereof, and of the entire record in this cause, the court be-
ing of opinion that. the said judgment is void, doth so adjudge 
and order, and doth deny the issuance of execution of said 
judgmen.t to which judgment and ruling of the Court the HilJ 
School excepted. 
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS FILED BY THE HILL SCHOOL 
ON 22 MAY, 1939. 
Be It Remembered that upon the trial of the scire facias 
issued in this case by the Clerk of this Court on the 8th 
day of March, 1939, at the instance of the Hill School for 
an award of an execution on the judgment of this court in 
its favor and against John R. Buchanan, entered on the 15th 
day of October, 1935, and the objections thereto filed in writ-
ing by said John R. Buchanan, and wherein a final judgment 
. was entered by this court on the 7th day of April, 
page 5 } 1939, refusing the award of execution thereon upon 
the ground that said judgment was void, the said 
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case was heard on the entire record in this luse, including 
that portion thereof which was certified to the!Supreme Court 
of Appeals, and considered by the said court on the writ uf 
error awarded John R. Buchanan in said suit (Record #1885); 
and that this, together with the said writ i of scire facias, 
the return aforesaid, and the said record i comprised the 
entire evidence upon which said judgment of !April 7th, 1939, 
was entered, and it is further certified that· the said Hill 
-School excepted to said ruling and judgment upon the ground 
that it was contrary to the law and evidence, and tendered 
this its bill of exceptions which is signed, sealed, enrolled and 
made a part of the record which is. accordjnglfi done, this 22nd 
day of May, 1939, after due notice to counsel for John R. 
Buchanan as to the time and place when the I same would be 
presented. · · i 
EXHIBIT NO. 2 WITH COMMISSIONER'S REPORT 
FILED, 11 SEPTEMBER, 193p. 
State of Pennsylvania, 
County of Montgomery, to-wit: 
I, William H. Bell, Treasurer of The Hill School, Pottstown, 
Pennsylvania, being first duly sworn, do dep~se and say that 
I am Treasurer of The Hill School located. at Pottstown, 
Pennsylvania, and as such familiar and acquainted with the 
facts hereinafter stated, and authorized to malrn this affidavit 
on behalf of said School, that James A. Buchanan, IV., the son 
of John R. Buchanan and Ruth Lester ·Buch~nan, was regu-
larly entered at said School and attended th~ same continu-
, ously during each of the three terrps of the Scho-
page 6 } lastic year 1934-5 beginning September 21, 1934, 
and ending June 24th, 1935, and was furnished sub-
sistence, lodging and instruction and other se I ices, textbooks, 
materials and incidentals all as shown by the a exed account; 
that said services, materials and incidentals ere all proper 
and necessary and essential to the proper e ucation, main-
tenance and training of said pupil; that the barges entered 
for the same were just, fair and reasonable a d those usually 
charged, and that no part thereof has been aid by any one 
except as shown on said account, and is all . ow due to the 
said Hill -School; and I do further make oath hat during said 
period and by direction of the proper schol stic authorities , 
the said James A. Buchanan, IV. was given e tra tutoring in 
French from January 14th to March 9th, 1935 for 27 periods, 
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flt the rate of $2.25 per period, by Professor Jasper J. Stahl, 
aggregating $60.75 which is still due said Jasper J. Stahl and 
is not included in the said account nor any charges entere·d 
therein. 
WILLIAM H. BELL. 
page 7 t I, T. E. Bartenstein, Clerk of the Circuit Court 
for the County of Fauquier in the State of Virginia, 
hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy 
of so much of the record of the cause lately pending in said 
Court styled Jo.kn R. BuchO!l'tan v. Ruth Lester B1echaru1.n, re-
hitiIJ.g to the Hill School, that was requested by the attorney 
for the def e.ndant, and as supplemental to· Record No. 1885. 
And I further certify that the notice required by Section 
6339 of the Code of Virginia, has been given. 
Given under my hand this 21 June, 1939. 
T. E. BARTENSTEIN, Clerk. 
Cost of this record $2.97. 
A Copy-Teste : 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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